Outlook 2016: Global Economy
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Growth will not recover of its own accord
- Global growth is sustained but serious action from policymakers is needed for growth acceleration
- US almost ready for first interest rates hike; rest of the world looks on anxiously
- Eurozone growth continues but joint action is needed to improve long-term growth potential
- Vulnerabilities exposed in China and other emerging countries
- Normalisation of monetary policy is risky for the economy, but so is excessively long-lasting expansionary monetary policy
In a nutshell
The global economy will expand in volume at a rate of about 3% in 2015. This is slightly down on 2014 (3.4%) and, looking ahead, about the same as we expect for 2016 (3¼%, table 1). This means that the global growth rate will have been almost unchanged since 2012, and for the fourth and fifth year in a row slightly trail the long-term average (3½%).
The breakdown of growth by region in 2015 mainly shows the cyclical downturn in the emerging markets (Figure 1). Of course the further slowdown in growth in China plays a role here. But China’s slower growth is also having an indirect effect on the demand for commodities. In the commodity producing economies, this is being felt in a fall in prices (IMF, 2015a; Rabobank, 2015; Briegel and Loman, 2015). Growth is being maintained in the US and the UK while the eurozone has even seen an acceleration in growth, albeit from a low base. Flat global growth for 2016 hides modest further growth pick up in the eurozone. If we consider the international economic environment from the perspective of the Dutch economy, this is good news; Europe and North America account for more than two-thirds of added value in Dutch exports (see our Outlook for the Dutch economy).
However there are also risks that could ultimately affect the Dutch economy too.
Firstly, while the current average growth rate for the emerging economies will be sustained in 2016, vulnerabilities have been exposed too. The Brazilian and Russian economies will clamber out of their deep recessions next year. But if we take a broader look, we see slower growth in China, lower commodity prices and the expected increase in US interest rates all putting pressure on growth rates in emerging countries. Secondly, while global growth is trickling along, we still see insufficient structural recovery. There are a number of multilateral trading initiatives that could give a welcome boost, such as the closer cooperation between the ASEAN countries (Weernink, 2015; Every, 2015) and the TTIP and TPP trade agreements being negotiated (Kalf and Marey, 2015; Kalf et al., 2015). These may be welcome impulses but they are also modest in size and their effect will only be felt over the course of many years. Thirdly, while we are being forced to stick to extremely expansionary monetary policy, there are increasing signs that in the longer term it may have side effects that dampen growth and that it may sow the seeds of new crises (Box 1). And whereas the US looks likely to be the first country to make a first move towards normalisation, a consequence of this is that the currency of the world’s biggest debtor will become more expensive while economies running trade surpluses, such as the eurozone, China and Japan, will actually benefit from (monetary policy induced) weaker currencies). It would be good to see globally coordinated monetary measures (in a repeat of the end of 2008), this time focused on the normalisation of monetary policy. Fourthly, the eurozone still lacks decisive leadership. That is essential to tackle the root causes of such economic challenges as weak investment, low productivity growth and the debt problems. It is also a requirement if Europe is to act in unison and effectively in the face of the many geopolitical challenges. Furthermore, only a more decisive command can ultimately counter anti-Euro(pe) sentiment. Muddling through policy-wise is disastrous from that point of view.
Box 1: Japanese lesson: more stimulus for less growth?
The US Fed is warily heading towards its first interest rate rise since 2006, both the ECB and the Bank of Japan may soon expand their quantitative easing (QE) programmes and China is expected to allow a big devaluation of its currency, see our Outlook on the financial markets. Given that the central banks are applying more of the same medication, we are expecting the outcome to be more of what we have already seen, which is weaker currencies (although this is obviously something that cannot be achieved collectively against each other’s currencies) and slightly higher inflation (expectations). However, if the eurozone leaders fail to support the ECB’s policy with solutions for structural economic problems, then the eurozone runs the risk of falling into the Japanese trap in which increasing amounts of QE are required to prevent stagnation and deflation.
A brief recap: shortly after his election at the end of 2012, the Japanese prime minister Abe launched ‘Abenomics’, a three-pronged economic programme aimed at getting Japan back on a path of growth and inflation. In the first place there was a substantial fiscal stimulus to bolster domestic demand. Seeing gross national debt at about 250% of GDP –increasing to about 400% of GDP in 2050 in a no policy change scenario (BIS, 2015)– this subsequently required fiscal consolidation. The first major step in this direction was taken in spring 2014 with an increase in VAT from 5% to 8%. The dramatic economic impact of this VAT hike has caused the further rise in VAT to 10% to be put on hold for the time being. In the second instance, structural reforms were intended to lead to a permanent strengthening of Japan’s growth potential. No real progress has been made in that area. All hope has therefore been pinned on the third priority area: monetary support by Japan’s central bank to ensure that growth and inflation do not immediately collapse again. Given that the economy is not yet sufficiently robust to absorb the fiscal consolidation through growth, the Japanese model rests primarily on a weak yen and additional monetary easing by the Japanese central bank where necessary.
Van den End and Hoeberichts (2014) and Erken et al. (2015) raise the question of whether low (real) interest rates can cause lower potential growth. This can happen via the misallocation of investments, with money being diverted to less productive uses, or through upward pressure on asset prices and debt - see for example the effect of QE in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the United Kingdom in driving house prices up (IMF, 2015b). Low interest rates can also encourage banks to roll over bad loans. Restructuring is postponed as a result, leaving too little room on the balance sheet to finance growth. Finally, QE can remove the incentive for politicians to undertake reforms. Van den End and Hoeberichts find a clear causal link for Japan between low interest rates and low growth. It is equally clear that there is no such link in the United States. The eurozone is a statistical borderline case. This highlights once again the risks of the sustained use of QE without at the same time tackling the structural problems, and explains the call by DNB (2015) to remove the non-performing loans from banks’ balance sheets that are currently impeding lending in parts of the currency union.
China: difficult to read
The slowdown in Chinese growth is the result of a deliberate Chinese policy to move to a more tenable economic growth model that is less dependent on credit expansion (Loman, 2015). That is highly desirable from the viewpoint of financial stability in the global economy in the medium term. However it is difficult to determine the current status of this transition. For instance, the Chinese government currently has a target for economic growth of around 7% and the statistics bureau will produce an improbably quick confirmation after the year-end that this growth target was largely achieved. The general opinion among analysts however is that actual growth was already substantially lower in 2015.
Looking beyond 2016, we are expecting Chinese growth (as officially reported) to fall further to a rate of about 4% to 5% in the medium term. Incidentally, this is a familiar phenomenon in economic history; after a period of fast growth, China has now more or less reached the income level at which fast-growing countries in the past saw their growth rates decline substantially (Eichengreen et al., 2011). That is the point at which the low-hanging economic fruit has largely already been picked and further progress can only be achieved through working harder and, especially, smarter. The low-hanging economic fruit for China consisted of making its production operations much more capital intensive, but hardly any efficiency gains were achieved in the deployment of workers and machines. That is where the challenges lie for the future, in part because China’s population is ageing and there will eventually be fewer workers available. But a more important factor is that this can only be achieved through giving freer rein to market forces, which will only increase the already existing tension between this and the central guiding of the economy and, in particular, the one-party system.
The Chinese government’s room for manoeuvre in its policymaking is visibly shrinking. In recent years, economic setbacks have consistently been countered by credit-financed boosts to expenditure. The internal debt mountain has now become so huge as a result that credit expansion is becoming a risk in its own right (Loman, 2015; IIF, 2015). This all should however be set off against the country’s enormous currency reserves, which ensure that Chinese economic developments are being monitored very closely around the world. This occasionally leads to nervous, overblown reactions in the global financial and commodity markets (Box 2). The resulting volatility is making it much trickier for the commodity producing economies (particularly emerging countries) to adjust to the new economic situation after the commodity boom.
Box 2: Chinese transition: wavering between two options
Two recent events underline how difficult it is to get a sense of the economic impact of China’s transition. The first is the plummeting Chinese stock markets in the summer of 2015. This highlights the Chinese government’s desire for market forces, but its lack of tolerance for the associated volatility. Despite prohibitions on sales, a shutdown of trading and the (indirect) purchase of equity securities, more than 40% of the stock market value went up in smoke in the course of a mere three months. Such unsuccessful interventions are fuelling concerns about the Chinese government’s ability to manage the transition. Incidentally, this has not yet affected the real economy. So far the stock markets, which have undergone limited deregulation, and the Chinese economy seem to be very separate worlds (Figure 2).
The second event is the surprising devaluation of the yuan in mid-August. This underlines the extent to which the Chinese government’s tolerance of low growth is limited. The devaluation of the yuan will partly have been prompted by China’s desire to be included in the IMF’s prestigious currency basket. After all, one of the IMF’s criteria for inclusion is that the currency valuation should be the result of market forces, and the yuan had been under pressure for some time. But the timing would not have been unappealing either as decoupling the yuan from the more expensive US dollar helped mitigate the decline in growth by improving China’s competitive position. This means that China is also becoming involved, whether deliberately or not, in the global struggle to implement policies that weaken currencies (see our Outlook on the financial markets).
Emerging markets: both vulnerable and resilient
Emerging economies have seen growth drop every year since 2010, in part because of the effect of steadily falling commodity prices (Figure 3). This is essentially primarily due to supply factors: good harvests in agriculture and additional investments in mining extraction and energy generation. There has also been downward pressure on all energy prices from the extra production of shale oil in the US, the recent OPEC decision to maintain production levels despite reduced revenue per barrel, Russia’s policy of compensating for the fall in income from oil by increasing the volume of sales and the expected integration of Iran as an oil producer in the world market following the nuclear deal. The resulting pressure on prices is the welcome shot in the arm for purchasing power throughout the Western world.
Even so, a reduction in demand seems to be playing an ever bigger role in the decline in commodity prices since spring 2015, fuelled in part by the slowdown in growth in China and concerns about the imminent increase in US interest rates. The extensive scaling back of investments in extraction capacity in the production countries is reducing the demand for capital goods. As a consequence, the purchasing power gains due to lower commodity prices at the global level are increasingly being accompanied by a reduction in demand in the emerging markets. This is one of the reasons for our modest growth forecast for 2016 and is the basis for investor caution concerning capital flows to emerging markets, not least because these markets have experienced an accelerated accumulation of (particularly corporate) debt in recent years, fuelled by the expansionary liquidity policies of Western central banks and low interest rates. According to the IIF (2015), 2015 will be the first year since 1988 with a net capital outflow from emerging countries.
All these developments are exposing numerous vulnerabilities in emerging markets, causing agitation in financial markets. Commodity producers such as Russia and Brazil already experienced depreciation of their currencies in 2014. Countries that are highly dependent on foreign financing, such as Turkey and Malaysia, and/or with a very unsettled domestic political situation, such as Malaysia, Thailand, Brazil and Turkey, were and are in the firing line (Figure 4). That in combination with rising corporate debt could cause local crises. Even so, in contrast to Haldane (2015), we are not expecting a new after-shock from the Great Recession. In the first place, the currency devaluations are relieving pressure to some extent. In addition, loans denominated in foreign currencies generally play a limited role (BIS, 2015), although they may reach substantial volumes in certain countries, such as Brazil (US dollars), Malaysia (US dollars), Turkey (US dollars and euros) and Poland (euros) (Dumitru and Kalf, 2015). Finally, emerging countries currently hold much higher levels of foreign exchange reserves than in the lead-up to previous crises (although Turkey is a significant exception in this regard).
US: damned if they do, damned if they don’t?
The fact that the Fed is considering what would be its first interest rate increase since 2006 (see our Outlook on the financial markets) is in itself a good sign regarding the state of the economy. The US economy has recorded average volume growth of 2% per annum since 2009 and economic activity in mid-2015 was around 9% higher than at the peak prior to the Great Recession. According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (the organisation that officially dates US recessions) the US economy has been in expansion since June 2009. That is 76 months, far above the post-war average of 58 months. Household debt as a percentage of disposable income has fallen by over 30 percentage points since the Great Recession, to just above 100% at present (IMF, 2015a). The labour market may have been slow to recover initially, but since the start of 2014 the net monthly growth in jobs has been more than 200 thousand, which has brought unemployment down slowly but surely to about 5% (Figure 5). Moreover, there has been ‘relatively independent growth’ since the end of 2014 in the sense that the Fed terminated quantitative easing then. That is, the dosage of the medication of monetary expansion was no longer being increased on a monthly basis. Low commodity prices are functioning as an additional impulse for domestic expenditure via low inflation (Figure 6). All in all, we see economic growth ending up at 2½% in 2016.
At the same time, we have to conclude that the US economy has not picked up sufficient steam to act as the engine for the global economy. America’s recovery after the Great Recession is less vigorous than after previous recessions. The current rate of growth also looks meagre when compared with average growth in the decade leading up to the Great Recession. And while unemployment has fallen to a level below which the labour market is considered to be tight, there is still underutilisation of capacity in a broader sense (Figure 5). This also explains why wage growth has remained modest so far. Even so, we can conclude that on balance, the US economy is ready for an increase in interest rates. Unfortunately, the net effect for the rest of the world will be negative rather than positive in the short term. The impact of this first step towards monetary policy normalisation on the US itself is not easy to predict either as it will eliminate the effects of the QE applied in the past through bumpy revaluations of financial assets. If the Fed normalises interest rates too quickly, that could have all kinds of side effects on the economy and financial markets that could considerably increase the risk of a new US recession — with a global impact (Marey, 2015).
Incidentally, it is far from being the case that postponement or the more gradual implementation of this monetary policy normalisation would eliminate these risks. On the contrary, in the short term it would force other major central banks to apply additional QE in order to keep their own currencies cheap relative to the dollar, and encourage China to further devalue the yuan. This would perpetuate the bizarre and worrying situation in which the country running the biggest deficit (in terms of the current account of its balance of payments) sees its currency becoming more expensive with respect to economies running a surplus, such as the eurozone, Japan and China. In the somewhat longer term, postponement would simply increase dependency on an expansionary monetary policy, with an increased risk of side effects (Box 1).
Eurozone: decisive political leadership is what recovery needs above all else
The dominating factor in the short term for the eurozone economy is the benefit from lower commodity prices, which is buttressing households’ purchasing power and driving up consumption growth to 1¾% this year. Exports —helped in particular in 2015 by a cheaper euro— are also propping up growth, along with the further reduction in the pace of austerity in the currency union. The eurozone economy is expected to achieve volume growth of 1½% in 2015 and that growth is even forecast to rise slightly to 1¾% in 2016. That is the good news and this is something that we should cherish. Seeing economic growth finally take off after years of indifferent growth, recession and political crises is extremely welcome.
Of course, even these short-term growth forecasts are subject to risks, for example from weakness in the emerging economies (Erken and Wijffelaars, 2015), or escalation of the emissions scandal at Volkswagen (Erken, 2015).
Furthermore, the German economy is vulnerable to a reduced demand for capital goods in emerging markets, France will eventually need to execute additional austerity measures and Spain’s surprising growth in 2015 may have relied too much on a reduction in savings by households. But to see the real challenge facing Europe, we need to look beyond the temporary boost from lower commodity prices and the low value of the euro, and consider how sustainable its growth is. The stabilisation of energy prices in 2016 (measured in euros) will largely put an end to the boost to purchasing power from that quarter, for instance, although underlying consumption growth will increase further. The cheap euro will temporarily push up exports, although this effect will dissipate more quickly if central banks outside the currency union also pursue a more expansionary policy (see our Outlook on the financial markets). Given that even the current rate of growth is not enough to make a convincing dent in unemployment (we are forecasting unemployment of 10.5% in 2016 compared with 7.5% in 2008), there is also a risk of much of the current unemployment becoming structural (Erken et al., 2015).
It is therefore important to revitalise investment growth and productivity growth on a permanent basis (Erken and Wijffelaars, 2015; Erken et al., 2015). The recovery in investment in the eurozone since the Great Recession has lagged far behind the recovery in the US and the UK (Figure 7). Of course one factor here is that the eurozone countries (bound as they are by the jointly agreed budget rules) have made more severe budget cuts than the United Kingdom and the United States, for example, which continued to support economic recovery through fiscal measures for longer. But the main underlying factor is the lack of decisiveness and governance in the eurozone. As a result, a crisis atmosphere was accepted time and time again between 2010 and 2013, and even occasionally encouraged in order to create acceptance for the economic course (of austerity and reforms) that was eventually adopted. While a clear, enforceable and, in particular, quick decision to follow this course would have led to all kinds of discussions about its appropriateness and economic impact, it would have had less of a negative effect on the economic recovery as it would have avoided the collateral damage caused by the euro crisis atmosphere.
Apart from the slower recovery resulting from this process, the faltering investment recovery is also due to the fact that businesses are still reducing their debt loads. Lending is also not yet playing a sufficient supporting role. While banks may no longer be tightening credit standards, neither are they relaxing them (Figure 8). On the other hand, demand for credit is cautiously rising again (Figure 9). Yet the European banking sector, especially in southern Europe, does not seem to be able to satisfy this demand due to balance-sheet restrictions and a substantial legacy of dubious loans. This is an impediment to a truly vigorous recovery in investment (Erken and Wijffelaars, 2015; DNB, 2015). In the US, where banks have been subjected to a stress test in 2009 and have been forced to take on additional capital where necessary, lending conditions have been relaxed slightly again in recent years and demand has also revived much more quickly. In the ECB’s Asset Quality Review (AQR) in 2014, European bank’s balance sheets were screened and a requirement set for additional capitalisation where necessary, but it did not lead to the removal of non-performing loans from the balance sheet.
Last but not least, a factor associated with the above developments is the decline in business dynamism in Europe. Ideally, human resources and machinery are constantly being redeployed due to the entry, growth and exit of firms. This ensures that maximum use is constantly being made of resources, which not only has a direct positive effect on productivity but also boosts competition and thus indirectly benefits productivity via this route. Unfortunately, the data show that the entry of new firms in eurozone countries is falling (Figure 10). The declining business dynamism is probably related to the faltering provision of credit; the non-performing loans on the balance sheets of southern European banks in particular are impeding the financing by banks of the entry and growth of healthy businesses.
And so we have become addicted to expansionary monetary policy. During the euro crisis, the European Central Bank kept the currency union intact through its monetary measures, and now we are hoping against hope that QE will lead to (lasting) economic recovery and that it will continue to mask the persistent macroeconomic imbalances in the currency union (Wijffelaars and Stegeman, 2014). An abrupt termination of QE would not be desirable from an economic perspective. But you could argue that since QE has been decided on, it would be wise to ensure that these funds find their way economic activity more directly, for example through the monetary financing of the Juncker plan (Benink and Boonstra, 2015; Loman, 2015), instead of mainly pushing up asset prices as is the case in the current setup. But once again, this requires the political decisiveness and governance that is lacking in the currency union.
Joint approach crucial
There seems to be increasing recognition of the need for Europe-wide solutions, although government leaders are not saying so explicitly. They are also remaining worryingly quiet about the risks of lengthy expansionary monetary policy. Via DNB (2015), the European System of Central Banks has voiced its plea to tackle the problem of non-performing bank loans seriously and thoroughly in order to put the banking sector in a position to finance growth again. With the initiatives to create a capital market union, action is also being taken to integrate the non-banking financial markets. The French plea for more centralisation, including a European ministry of Finance, is being voiced by both the European Commission (Moscovici, 2015) and former ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet (FD, 2015).
What Europe needs above all —whether through centralisation or joint support— is a decisive, comprehensive approach to the problems that it is encountering. Incidentally, that covers much more than just the economic problems that the eurozone in particular is struggling with, such as a lasting solution to the ‘Greece issue,’ including debt relief for this country, which is both essential and inevitable (see Wijffelaars, 2015a). For the problems also involve issues that affect the European Union in general, including the ambitious completion of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the US (Kalf and Marey, 2015), a concerted role in the conflict in Syria, a united voice against an opportunistic Russia and a European approach to the refugee problem that enjoys broad support (see Erken (2015) for an economic analysis of the latter problem). Europe’s external borders are currently formed by a band of countries characterised by conflict and instability (Figure 11).
In the long run, muddling through will only feed anti-Euro(pe) sentiment, as is evident from the mood in Britain in the run-up to the Brexit referendum, the outcome in the Catalan elections (Wijffelaars, 2015b) and of course the dismal six-month-long process of negotiations for the third bailout package for Greece (Wijffelaars, 2015a). Kalf and Briegel (2015) consider the political trends in Europe in more depth. But it should be said that the combination of slower growth and the need for economic reforms is fuelling populism in politics more generally, as is demonstrated by the political situation in Turkey (Briegel, 2015a) and Poland (Briegel, 2015b). Unfortunately, this is leading to a renewed focus on short-term economic stimuli rather than putting an effort into improving the real potential for economic growth.
Annex: key macro-economic indicators
Acharya, V., Cecchetti, S.G., De Gregorio, J., Kalemli-Özcan, S., Lane, P. and U. Panizza (2015), “Corporate debt in emerging economies: A threat to financial stability?” International Economic Policy and Reform Committee Paper, September.
Benink, H. and W. Boonstra (2015), “Hoe de ECB en Europese investeringsbank Europa vlot kunnen trekken (in Dutch),” MeJudice, 9 January.
BIS (2015), “When the financial becomes real,” Chapter 3 of Bank for International Settlements 85th Annual Report.
Briegel, F. (2015a), “Turkije: hoogste tijd voor een nieuwe regering, in Dutch” Rabobank Economic Report, 23 October
Briegel, F. (2015b), “Poolse parlementsverkiezingen: zorgen over mogelijke terugkeer van PiS-partij overtrokken (in Dutch),” Rabobank Economic Report, 23 October
Briegel, F. and H. Loman (2015), “Global economic outlook: disappointing growth in EMs slows down world economy,” Rabobank Economic Quarterly, 10 September.
Criscuolo, C., Gal, P.N. and C. Menon (2014), “The dynamics of employment growth: new evidence from 18 countries,” OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Paper 14, OECD Publishing.
DNB (2015), “Overzicht financiële stabiliteit Najaar 2015 (in Dutch),” October.
Dumitru, A. (2015), “Behind the curtains of the oil price plunge,” Rabobank Special, 2 April.
Dumitru, A. and F. Briegel (2015), “Lage grondstoffenprijzen goed voor de wereldeconomie? (in Dutch),” Rabobank Economic Comment, 7 August.
Dumitru, A. and J. Kalf (2015), “Vormt opdrogende liquiditeit in opkomende markten een risico voor de groei? (in Dutch),” Rabobank Economic Comment, 8 October.
Eichengreen, B., Park, D. and K. Shin (2011), “When fast growing economies slow down: international evidence and implications for China,” National Bureau for Economic Research Working Paper 16191, Cambridge (MA).
End, J. W. van den, and M. Hoeberichts (2014), “Low real rates as driver of secular stagnation: empirical assessment,” De Nederlandsche Bank Working Paper 444, October.
Erken, H. (2015), “Germany: higher growth, but the risks are increasing,” Rabobank Economic Report, 1 October.
Erken, H. and M. Wijffelaars (2015), “Eurozone: groei zet door; investeringen rem op krachtig herstel (in Dutch),” Rabobank Economic Quarterly, 10 September.
Erken, H., Groot, E. de, and S. Koopman (2015), “Why growth keeps disappointing,” Rabobank Special, 17 August.
Every, M. (2015), “The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC): is it EU 2.0?,” Rabobank Special, 2 October.
Haldane, A. (2015), “How low can you go?” speech given at the Portadown Chamber of Commerce, Northern Ireland, 18 September.
Hayat, R. (2015a), “Oil: the good, the bad and the ugly,” Rabobank Special, 5 March.
Hayat, R. (2015b), “Iran: dealing with the deal,” Rabobank Economic Report, 18 August.
Hayat, R. and J. Kalf (2015), “Iran/VS: een nucleaire deal met impact (in Dutch),” Rabobank Economic Comment, 9 April.
Het Financieele Dagblad (2015), Trichet: lage inflatie bijzonder zorgwekkend (in Dutch), 7 October.
IIF (2015), “Capital flows to emerging markets,” institute of International Finance, 1 October
IMF (2015a), “World Economic Outlook,” Internationaal Monetair Fonds, October.
IMF (2015b), “Global Housing Watch,” July.
Kalf, J. and P. Marey (2015), “Mare liberum: enhancing trade across two oceans with TPP and TTIP,” Rabobank Economic Report, 8 September
Kalf, J., Mulder, N-D, Bellamy, K. and S. van Battum (2015), “TTIP: gevolgen voor de Nederlandse F&A sector (in Dutch),” Rabobank Special, 11 September.
Kalf, J. and F. Briegel (2015), “Politics - European trends, national consequences,” Rabobank Economic Report, 21 May.
Loman, H. (2015), “China: onzekerheden nemen toe (in Dutch),” Rabobank Economic Quarterly, 10 September.
Marey, P. (2015), Thinking about the next US recession, Rabobank Special, 30 October.
Moscovici, P. (2015), “Promoting growth and stability in the EU,” Speech given at Bruegel 10th anniversary event, Berlin, 28 September.
Rabobank (2015), “Latin America after the commodity boom,” Rabobank Special, 2 October.
Weernink, M. (2015), “Voortgang in de economische integratie van de ASEAN? (in Dutch),” Rabobank Special, 2 September.
Wijffelaars, M. (2015a), “Griekse verkiezingsuitslag: steun voor euro gegroeid, onzekerheid blijft (in Dutch),” Rabobank Economic Report, 21 September.
Wijffelaars, M. (2015b), “Separatisten winnen verkiezingen Catalonië, (in Dutch)” Rabobank Economic Comment, 28 September.
Wijffelaars, M. (2015c), “Recent developments in Greece,” Rabobank Economic Comment, 21 September.
Wijffelaars, M. and H. Stegeman (2014), “Europese Commissie kijkt toe terwijl Europa uit balans blijft (in Dutch),” Me Judice, 17 March.
To the Outlook 2016 overview page
Outlook 2016 is a publication of Economic Research (ER) of Rabobank. The view presented in this publication has been based on data from sources we consider to be reliable. Among others. these include Macrobond, , NiGEM, Statistics Netherlands, Economic Policy Analysis, Vereniging Eigen Huis, De Nederlandsche Bank and Eurostat. The date of completion is 13 November 2015.
This data has been carefully incorporated into our analyses. Rabobank accepts. however. no liability whatsoever should the data or prognoses presented in this publication contain any errors. The information concerned is of a general nature and is subject to change.
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